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COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR MARKET GAMES: 
THE STRONG CONCAVITY CASE 
Luis C. Corchón 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we study the effects of a change in sorne exogenous variable 
(the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the 
strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash Equilibrium in the framework 
of a Market Game (a generalization of the Cournot model)o We assume a strong 
concavity condition which implies that the best reply function of any player 
is decreasing on sum of the strategies of the remaining players (Le. 
strategic substitution). Our results generalize and unify those known in the 
Cournot model. 
1.- INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we study the effects of changes in the number of players 
and shifts in their payoff function on the strategies played and the payoffs 
obtained in a Nash Equilibrium. We will assume on the class of games under 
consideration that the payoff function of each player fulfills the following: 
I) It can be written as a function of her own strategy (assumed to be one 
dimensionaD and the sum of the strategies of all players. This assumption has 
been called the "Aggregation Axiom" by Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik (1980), p. 
346 and the corresponding games are called market games (for a different 
definition of a market game see Shubik (1984) p. 314). According to M. Shubik 
(1984) p. 325) "Games with the above property clearly have much more structure 
than a game selected at random. How this structure influences the equilibrium 
points has not yet been explored at depth". 
II) It satisfies a strong concavity condition slight1y stronger than the 
Strategic Substitutes case studied by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (985). 
The latter implies that the best reply function of each player (Le. the 
mapping selecting the best strategy for a player, given the strategies of the 
remaining players) is decreasing on the strategies of other players. 
Notice that the class of games satisfying I) and II) is large and include 
a) Models of strategic competition in quantities (as the Cournot model, 
competition under rationing schemes -see Romano (1988)-, etc), Le. oligopoly 
without or (in sorne cases) with product differentiation, 
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b) Models of strategic interaction among firms like technological 
competition (see Loury (1979», the problem of the commons (see Dasgupta and 
Heal (1979) pp. 55-78) and pollution games, and 
c) Models focusing on internal organization of firms or the like as 
contribution and revelation games and principal-many agents models. 
In aH the above cases uncertainty, taxes and payoff functions different 
from profit functions (Le. sales) are allowed. 
We first prove that the best reply functions of a game satisfying the 
aggregation axiom and the strategic substitution condition do not have any 
structural property beyond that they depend on the sum of strategies of the 
remaining players and that they are decreasing (Theorem 1). This result can be 
used to motivate the need of our strong concavity assumption. Assuming the 
latter we show that: 
1) An increase in the number of players, a) decreases the value of the 
strategy of any incumbent, and increases the sum of all strategies 
(Proposition 1). b) Decreases the payoff of incumbents (Propositions 2-3). 
2) A shift raising the marginal payoff curve of a player, say i, a) 
increases the sum of strategies and the strategy of player i, and decreases 
the strategy of any other player (Proposition 4). b) Increases the payoff of 
player i and decreases the payoff of any other player (Proposition 5). 
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3) A shift raising the marginal payoff curve of aL! players increases the 
sum of all strategies (Proposition 6). 
4) We provide counterexamples to all Propositions when the strong 
concavity assumption is not fulfilled. AIso two more examples are used to show 
that in the case considered in 3) aboye nothing can be said about individual 
strategies and utilities. Sorne of these examples are taken from previous work 
and are included here for the sake of completeness. 
Summing up, O, 2) and 3) aboye show that under our assumptions, the 
effects of an increase in the number of players or a shift in their payoff 
function agrees with our a priori intuition. 1) aboye has been studied in the 
Cournot case by Me Manus (1962), (1964), Frank (1965), Ruffin (1970, Okuguchi 
(1973), Seade (1980) and Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1982). It must be noticed 
that our approach not only generalizes these results but allows for simpler 
proofs and do es not require that the number of players can be treated as a 
continuous variable. Parts 2)-3) aboye have been studied in the Cournot case 
by Dixit (986) and Quirmbach (988). Besides the fact that our results apply 
to a more general class of models, the motivation for our results in an 
oligopolistic framework is twofold: 
i) On the one hand in an imperfectly competitive market even if a firm 
cares only about profits, profit maximization is not, in general, the best 
policy to be pursued and moreover it does not guarantee survival (see e.g. 
Vickers (1985». Therefore the classical hypothesis of profit maximization 
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lacks a convincing foundation in oligopolistic markets and has to be 
generalized to allow for the maximization of a more complex payoff function. 
AIso, from the classical contribution of Baumol (959) it is customary to 
argue that firms might be interested in objectives other than profits. 
ii) On the other hand, in contrast with many contributions quoted aboye, 
our approach does not rely on dynamics at aH. This is not because the author 
thinks that comparative statics can not profit from stability considerations 
but because the actual dynamic processes which are used can hardly being 
justified. Moreover, this stability conditions are usually very strong. For 
instance in the Cournot model with linear demand and cost functions, the 
equilibrium is unstable if the number of firms is greater than two. Thus, the 
aim of the paper is to obtain the best possible results which depend only on 
the aggregation axiom and the strong concavity condition. 
Our results can be compared with those obtained under the (polar) 
assumption of supermodularity. Roughly speaking, a game is supermodular when 
for each player her strategy set is the product of compact intervals and the 
marginal profitability of any action increases with any other action of any 
player (see Topkis (979) for a more general definition). When strategy sets 
are one-dimensional the aboye definition reduces to that of a game with 
strategic complementarities (see Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (985)). It 
can be shown that if the marginal profitability of any action is increasing on 
a parameter, say T, (this is identical to our assumption 4), the largest and 
smallest Nash equilibria are increasing functions of T so if the Nash 
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equilibrium is unique, it is increasing on 1:' (see Lippman, Mamer and McCardle 
(987), Milgrom and Roberts (990), Milgrom and Shannon (992))<1). This is 
analogous to our Propositions 4 and 6 (but in our case individual strategies 
are not always increasing on 1:', see example 6). Notice that the distinction 
between idiosyncratic and generalized shock s does not play any role in 
supermodular games. At the best of my knowledge there are no results in the 
supermodular games literature on the effect of entry (Propositions 1-3) below) 
or the effect of a change in 1:' on payoffs (Proposition 5 and example 6). 
The rest of the paper goes as follows. The next Section explains the 
basic model and the main assumptions. Section 3 studies the effect of an 
increase in the number of players and Section 4 focuses on shifts of the 
marginal payoff curve. Finally Section 5 gathers our final comments. 
Ul Other 
equlllbrlum 
propertles of supermodular games are that 1) 
do es not requlre quasl-eoneavlty of the 
the exlstenee of 
payoff funetlons, 
under eertaln elreumstanees, If there are several Nash equlllbria, they 
a Nash 
and Z) 
ean 
Pareto-ranked. Applleatlons of supermodular games lnelude Bayeslan games 
be 
and 
(see ollgopollstle eompetltlon (see Vives (1990)), stablllty and 
Llppman, Mamer and MeCardle (1987), Mllgrom and Roberts (1990) 
(1993)) and eoordlnatlon problems In a maeroeeonomle framework 
learnlng 
and 
(see 
Krlshna 
Sllvestre 
(1993) for a survey of thls lIterature). For general surveys on supermodular 
games see Fudenberg and Tlrole (1991) and Vives (1993). 
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11.- THE MODEL 
In this Section we will explain the main concepts which wiU be used in 
the rest of the papero 
Definition 1.- A market game (U ( ), S) consist of 
I I IEI 
a) A set of pLayers (aLso caLLed agents) 1 = 1, 2, ... , n. 
b) A coLLecHon of strategy sets S = R . 
I + 
c) A coLLection of payoff functions U: X S ~ R of the form 
I I El I 
U (x , x) where x E S and x = E 
I I I I jEI 
x. j 
In words, in a market game, the so-caUed "Aggregation Axiom" holds (see 
Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik (1980), p. 346), so the (one dimensional) 
strategies of the players can be aggregated in an additive way. We remark that 
aU the Propositions below can be proved if x = f(x, ... , x) (f( ) stricUy 
1 n 
increasing) iniroducing suitable concavity assumptions. A market game can be 
thought of as a generalization of the well-known Cournot model. In this case 
u = p(x)x - C (x), x being the output of firm i, x total output, p(x) the 
I I I I I 
inverse demand function and C (x) the cost function of firm L This case will 
I I 
be used in most examples below. We remark that our approach can deal with a) 
payoff functions different from profit (Le. Welfare-maximizing publicly owned 
firms, see Fershtman (1990», b) symmetric uncertainty (for the Cournot case 
see Horowitz (1987», e) taxes (for the Cournot case see Dierickx, Matutes and 
Neven (1988» and d) in sorne cases, heterogeneous product (using the trick of 
Yarrow (1985), p. 517). Other examples of market games (technological 
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competition, the problem of the commons, preference revelation, contribution 
games, pollution and wage-setting trade unions) are explained in Table 1. 
x x u (x ,x) x=f(x , ... ,x ) 
i i i 1 n 
porcentual Inflation Utility Inflation 
Trade-Unions increase rate function rate as a in wage of trade function of 
rate union 1 wage rate 
increases 
Polution Output of Amount of Profit Production firm i Pollution func ti on of Polution 
Contribution Production 
Games Private Inputs Quantity of Utility function of (Public the public function the public 
Goods,Princ! offered by i good / Reward of agent i good / Reward 
pal Agents) func ti on 
Preference Preference Utili ty parameters to Social State Social Rule Revelation be revealed function 
Problem of Inputs used An Profit Environment as 
environmental a function of the COlllllons by firm i 
variable function inputs 
Oligopoly Output of Price Profit Inverse demand firm i function function 
Technologi- Input needed Technology to produce the Technological Profit 
cal Competi- technology level function as a function tion 
used by firm i of inputs 
TABLE 1 
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Now we state our solution concepto 
Definition 2: Given a market game (U( 
I 
* * (x ,x ) 
I lel 
with 
* * ~ x x e S Vi e 1 is said to be a Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) if Vi e 1 
L..¡el l' I I 
* • * * U (x , x ) ~ U (x ,x - x + x) Vx e S 
I I I I I I I I 
Now we state and discuss our main assumptions. 
Assumption 1: U ( ) e ~1 Vi e 1. 
I 
• 
* x = 
Notice that under Assumption 1 (A.l in what follows) if x e int. S the 
1 I 
necessary condition of a N.E. reads as follows: 
8U (x*, x*) 8U (x*, x*) 
I I I I 
= O + V i e 1. 
8x 8x 
I 
Let us define 
8U (x ,x) 8U (x ,x) 
T T (x , x) I I I I = ;: + I I I 8x 8x 
V i e 1 
I 
Let N be the set of active agents (Le. those for which x· e int. S in a 
I I 
N.E. with n players). N+l is defined accordingly. We will assume that N " N+l 
'" 121, Le. at least one player is active in N.E. with n and n+l agents 
respecti vely. 
Assumption 2: T (x, x) is strictly decreasing on x and x V i e 1. 
I I I 
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A sufficient condition for A.2 to hold is that U ( ) be strictly concave 
8ZU ( 
on x and x and(if U e {;Z) that __ 1 __ - <O. 
1 1 8 x X 
1 
In the homogeneous oligopoly case A.2 is equivalent to a much used 
condition in the literature on Cournot equilibrium (see e.g. Friedman (1982) 
p. 496, assumption 3 and the references therein) namely 
8p( 8p ( 
----x + < O and < O 
8xZ 1 8x 8x 
It can be readily seen that A.2 implies that the best reply function is 
decreasing, Le. the assumption of Strategic Substitutes in terminology of 
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). Finally, we state our third 
assumption. 
Assumption 3: u ( ) is strictly decreasing on x 'rJ i e l. 
1 
This assumption will be only used in Propositions 2, 3 and 5. If U ( ) 
1 
were strictly increasing in x, the reverse conclusions would be true. In the 
Cournot case A.3 requires a strictly decreasing inverse demand curve. 
Notice that A.l and 2 plus a compactness requirement imply the existence 
of an unique N.E. and that under A.l and 3 any interior N.E. can be shown to 
be inefficient, Le. there is a strategy vector for which all players are 
better off (for proofs of these facts see Friedman (1977) pp. 25-6 and 169-71. 
See Kukushkin (1993) for a more general result on the existence of a N.E.). 
13 
The reader may wonder if, under the aggregation axiom, strategic 
substitution alone may be sufficient to yield well defined answers to our 
comparative statics questions. The following Theorem looks for structural 
properties of best reply functions under these two assumptions and finds a 
negative resulto First, let us define x 
-1 - E X. j 
Theorem 1: Let x = f (x) i = 1, ... , n be a coHecHon of r;o functions 
1 1-1 
defined on a compact set and such that f ( ) is strictLy decreasing \Ji. Then, 
1 
1 
a) \Ji, 3 U (x ,x), U ( ) e r; , concave on x such that 
1 1 1 1 
f (x ) = argo max U (a, a+x), \Jx 
1 -1 a e s 1 -1 -1 
1 
Moreover, U ( ) can be taken to be decreasing on x (Le., fulfiHing A.3) 
1 
b) \J, 3 a r;l cost function e (x ) and a linear inverse demand function 
1 1 1 
p = A - x such that 
f (x ) = argo max (A - b - x )b - e (b) \Jx 
1 -1 b e s -1 1 -1 
1 
Proof: a) First notice that f ( ) is invertible. Also, f-l( ) is integrable 
1 1 
since ¡-l( ) e r;o (by the continuity of f ( ), see Bartle (976), p. 156), and 
1 1 
it is bounded (see BartLe (976) p. 427). Let q (x) be the primitive of 
1 1 
f~l( x). Define U = 
1 1 1 
Then we have that 
BU 
1 
Bx 
1 
2 q (x) + x - xx. Notice that U is decreasing on x. 
1 1 1 i 1 
= f-l(x) + 2x- x- x = ¡-l(x) - X = O. 
1 1 1 i 1 1 -1 
and since f-l( ) is strictly decreasing U is concave on x, so the second 
1 1 1 
order condiHon of payoff maximization is satisfied and thus, a) hoLds. 
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b) Let p(x) == A - x and C (x) == Ax - x2 - q (x) + B, where q ( ) is as 
I I I I I I I 
defined in part a) aboye. Since x is defined on a compact set, B can be taken 
I 
large enough such that C(x) le O, 
I 
marginal cost is positiye. Then, 
"Ix. Also, taking A large enough, the 
I 
TT == p(x)x - C(X) = (A-x)x - Ax - x2 - q (x) - B = q (x) + x2 - xx - B I I I I I I i I I I i I 
which is identical to the utility function constructed in part a) aboye. 
The main consequence of Theorem 1 is that in games in which both the 
aggregation axiom and the strategic substitution assumption hold, that the 
best reply functions depend on the sum of strategies of the other players and 
that they are decreasing exhaust aH the properties of best reply functions. 
Thus, they are, up to some extent, arbitrary (this result may be regarded as 
analogous to the lack of structural properties of excess demand functions in 
General Equilibrium, see Sonnenschein and Shafer (982) but in our case the 
root of the problem is not on the aggregation side). Even if payoff functions 
are restricted to be profit functions, no structural property beyond those 
quoted aboye can be found!. 
As an easy coroHary of Theorem 1 we have that a) the equilibrium set of 
strategies is arbitrary and b) comparative statics will not yield definitive 
answers. 80th points can be easily seen in the case of two players by 
constructing best reply mappings which intersect at any given set of points 
and by considering shifts of these curves and comparing non adjacent 
equilibria. Thus, we are lead to conclude that in general, we need additional 
properties to those quoted before in order to tackle comparative statics. As 
we will see our A.2 will be sufficient for this jobo 
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111.- THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY 
In this Section we will study the effects of an increase in the number of 
players (see Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and the references there for the 
empirical evidence in oligopolistic markets). In order to save notation let 
y == x (n+1). Also, let us denote by x(n), x (n) and U (n) the equilibrium 
n+l I I 
values of x, x and U in a game with n players. 
I I 
Proposition 1: Under A.1-2 we have that 
a) x(n) ~ x(n+1), x (n) ~ x (n+1) 'rI i e N and 
I I 
b) if Y > O the aboye inequaLities are strict. 
Proof: We first notice that if x(n) ~ x(n+1) and x (n) > O, x (n+1) = O is 
I I 
impossible since T (x (n), 
I I 
x(n» ~ T (O, 
I 
x(n+1» ~ T (O, 
I 
x(n» would 
(2) 
contradict that T ( ) is strictly decreasing on x . Take any i e N " N+l (if 
I I 
i t! N+l, x (n) > x (n+1) = O). In both N.E. first order conditions hold so 
I I 
(1) T (x (n), x(n» = T (x (n+1), x(n+1». 
I I I I 
Therefore beca use A.2 we have onLy two possibilities: 
1.- x(n+1) ~ x(n) and x (n+1) ~ x (n), with a strict inequality or 
I I 
Il.- x(n+1) ~ x(n) and x (n+1) ~ x (n). 
I I 
(2) A similar argument shows that Ir x(n) ~ x(n+1) and x(n) 
o, so the second Inequallty In a) In Proposltlon 1 holds 'rI I e l. 
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O, then x(n+1) = 
If I hoLds, since aH active pLayers at n are active at n+l and x = E x 
1 
we have a contradiction. Therefore part a) is proved. Part b) is proved 
noticing that O) impLies that if x(n) = x(n+Z), then x (n) = x (n+1) '<1 i e N 
1 1 
" N+l. But since aH active pLayers at n wiLL be active at n+l and y > O we 
reach a contradiction. Therefore x(n) < x(n+1), A.2. pLus (1) show that x (n) 
1 
'> x (n+1) '<1 i E N " N+l. FinaLLy if i f N+l but i E N x (n) > x (n+1) = O •• 
1 1 1 
If A.2 do es not hold, Proposition 1 fails as the following examples 
-which refer to the Cournot model- show. 
ExampLe 1.- -0'8 (Seade (980)). Let p = x • e = x. Using the first order 
1 1 
conditions of profit maximization, it is easiLy seen that x (1) < x (2). 
1 i 
2 ExampLe 2.- p = a - bx, e = cx + d/2 x with a > c, d < O, d + 2b > O and 
1 1 1 
d + b < O. (TotaL costs wiH be negative for x Large enough, but this can be 
(a - c)n 
fixed). Then x = so x is decreasing with n if b + d < O. On the 
b+d+nb 
other hand second order conditions are fuLfiLLed if d+2b > O. A graphicaL 
argument similar to ExampLe 2 can be found in Mc Manus (964). 
We now turn to study how paj'offs change with entry. 
Proposition 2: Under A.l, A.2 and A.3 
a) U (n) ~ U (n+1). 
1 1 
b) If Y > O the above inequaLities are strict. 
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Proof: In order to save notation let us write x (n) as the strategies of all 
-1 
players except i in a N.E. with n players, i.e. x (n) = x(n) - x (n). Also 
-1 1 
define V ( ) == U (x, x + x) == V (x, x ). Then, if Proposition 2 a) were 
1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
not true, V (x (n+1), x (n+1)) > V (x (n), x (n)) ~ V (x (n+1), x (n)). 
1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 
Thus, x (n) > x (n+1) which contradicts that x (n) is non-decreasing in n 
-1 -1 -1 
by Proposition 1 a). In order to show b) let us assume that U (n) = U (n+1). 
1 1 
Then, reasoning as aboye we get x Jn) ~ x (n+1) contradicting that if y > O, 
-1 -1 
x (n) is strictly increasing in n (by Proposition 1 b)) .• 
-1 
If A.2 holds but U ( ) is increasing on x we have the reverse conclusion. 
1 
The following example shows that if A.2 does not hold, Proposition 2 may fail. 
Example 3.- Let us assume 2 agents with identical payoff functions (see Figure 
1). Because A.3, payoffs increase in the direction of the arrows. Point A is a 
symmetrical N.E. with 2 players since any player can only change unilaterally 
x and x on the 45° Une (x and x change in the same amount since the 
1 1 
strategies of other players are given). By the same token B is a symmetrical 
N.E. with 3 players and such that the payoff of 1 and 2 is now greater (notice 
that if n = 1 A' A and DA would be identical and the example does not work). 
Notice than in Example 3 we have that n > 1. If this is not the case, 
Le. there is a unique incumbent player, the entry of a new player will always 
decrease the payoff of the incumbent, i. e. her payoff is bigger under 
monopoly than under duopoly as shown by the next Proposition (notice that 
Assumptions 1-2 are not required and that if U( ) is increasing in x, it is 
easy to show that entry increases the payoff of the incumbent. 
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Proposition 3.- Under A.3 we have that 
a) U O) ?! u (2) and 
1 1 
b) if x (2) > O then the aboye inequaLity is strict. 
2 
Proof: Suppose it is noto Defining V ( ) as before we have that 
1 
v (x (2), x (2» ?! V (x O), O) ?! V (x (2), O) 
11 2 11 11 
And since V ( ) is decreasing on x we get a contradiction .• 
1 -1 
X 
1 
o 
FIGURE 1 
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IV.- THE EFFECTS OF SHOCKS 
In this Section we will study the effect of an exogenous shift in the 
payoff function on the relevant variables. We will assume that the payoff 
function of player i can be written as U = U (x I X, t) where t is a one 
1 1 1 1 1 
dimensional parameter which is possibly different for different players (in 
the Cournot model t may represent either the factors behind the demand side 
1 
or the cost side or as in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) the quantity of capital 
own by firm O. In this Section, in order to simplify the proofs we will 
assume that Nash Equilibria are interior. Then, the first order condition 
reads T (x I X, t) = o. Finally the values of the strategies and payoffs in a 
1 1 1 
Nash Equilibrium will be denoted by x·, x·, and U·. 
1 i 
Assumption 4: , T ( ) is strictly increasing in t . 
1 1 
This assumption allows us to interpret increases in t. as shifts to the 
1 
right of the marginal payoff curve, Le. t can be· regarded as a measure of 
1 
the impact of a shock on the marginal payoff of player L 
We will distinguish two types of shocks: idiosyncratic and generalized. 
In the first we will study the impact on the market of a variation in a single 
t (Le. an increase in the price of the factors or the taxes payed by player 
1 
D. In the second we consider a simultaneous variation in all t, 
1 
= 1, ... ,n. 
This corresponds, for instance, to a shift in the common demand function or 
the price of a factor used by all players in the industry. In this case, 
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without loss of generality we will write the first order condition as a 
function of a single t, Le. T (x , x, t) = O. 
1 1 
Intuition suggests that in the case of an idiosyncratic shock an increase 
in t will increase the strategy of player i and it will decrease those of its 
1 
competitors. This intuition is formalized in the next Proposition: 
Proposition 4: Under A. 1, A. 2 and A. 4 an increase in t, a) increases the 
1 
~ 
sum of strategies b) increases the strategy of player i and c) decreases the 
strategy of any other player in the market. 
Proof: Since the proof is fairly analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 we 
wiH indicate only the guidelines. First it is proven that the sum of 
strategies can not be constant. Second, if the sum of strategies decreases, 
the strategy of aH players must increase in order to maintain first order 
conditions and this is a contradiction. Thus, the sum of strategies increases. 
Again first order conditions of all players except i imply that the strategy 
of these players must fallo Therefore the strategy of i must increase .• 
Of course if the inequality in AA is reversed so are the conclusions of 
Proposition 4. An implication of this Proposition is -in contrast with 
supermodular games- the absence of multiplier effects Le. dx/dt < dx Idt 
1 1 1 
(see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) p. 498). The next example -which again refers 
to the Cournot model- will show that A.2 is needed for the result to hold. 
21 
Example 4.- Suppose that there are three firms and that in a (suffieiently 
large) neighborhood of a N.E. the relevant funetions read p = a' - x, C = ex 
1 1 
- d/2 x2 - t x with a' > e, d > O, d - 2 < O (so the seeond order eondition 
1 1 1 
holds), d - 1 > O, and C
I 
= e'x
I
, with a' > e', i = 2, 3. Let a == a'- e and 
let a == a' - e'. Profit maximization implies that x = (x - a - t )/(d - 1) and 
1 1 
x
l
= a - x, i = 2, 3. Solving the system we get x = (2a (d 1)-.i-t)/ 
1 
(3(d - 1) - 1). [f, for instanee, a = 10, d = 1.5, t = 5 and .i = 1 we have 
1 
that x* = 8, x* = 4 XII = 2. But if t = 5.5, x* = 7, x* = 1, x* = 3. 
1 ' i 1 1 i 
For the next Proposition we will need an additional assumption. This 
assumption plus A.4 implies that a variation in t affects both marginal and 
i 
total payoff in the same direction. 
Assumption 5: U ( ) is inereasing on t. 
i i 
Proposition 5: [f all payoff funetions are ~2 and A. 2-5 hold, an inerease in 
t, a) inereases the payoff of i and b) deereases the payoff of any other 
i 
player 
Proof: First, it is easy -but tedious- to show that all variables are 
eontinuously differentiable funetions of t in a neighborhood of equi.librium, 
i 
sinee assumption 2 implies that the Jaeobian matrix of T ( ) has a non 
i 
vanishing determinant. Then, taking into aeeount the first order eonditions 
for player j~i, we have that 
dU /dt = 8U ( )/8x o (dx/dt - dx /dt ) J I J ¡ j i 
22 
and Proposition 4 and A. 3 impLy b) aboye. In the case of pLayer i we have 
that 
dU /dt = au ( )/ax o (dx/dt - dx /dt)+ au ( )/at 
i I I I I I I i 
and since the strategy of aH competitors has decreased and A. 5 we obtain a) 
above .• 
The next example shows the necessity of A.2 for Proposition 5 to hold 
ExampLe 5.- $uppose that the market is as in exampLe 4. Then it is easiLy 
caLcuLated that if t = 5, U*= 4 and U* = 4, i = 2, 3. But if t = 5.5, U* = O 
1 1 i 1 1 
and U*= 9, i = 2, 3. 
I 
We will end this Section by studying the effects of a generalized shock. 
Proposition 6: Under A. 1, 2 and 4 an increase in t increases x 
Proof: First, by anaLogous reasoning to Proposition 1 it can be shown that x 
can not be constant. And if x decreases aH x must increase. Contradiction •• 
I 
The effect of t on individual strategies and payoffs in equilibrium 
depends on how payoff functions are affected (see Dixit (986) and Quirmbach 
(988)). This means that, in the Cournot model, a technological improvement in 
costs might decrease the output and profits of the most efficient firm (see 
example 6). Finally without A. 2 Proposition 6 does not hold (see example 7). 
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Example 6.- Let p = a - x, n = 2, e = e x , e = ex e x . Take t = - el' so 
1 1 1 2 1 2 
A. 2 and 4 hold. It can be easily shown that in the N.E. x* = (a 
1 
+ ex e -
1 
2e )/3 and U* = ((a - t (ex - 2» / 3l. Thus if ex > 2, the output and profits 
1 1 1 
of firm 1 (whieh is the most efficient firm) deereases with t. 
Example 7.- Let p = x + t - A, e = 2.5 x 2/2, n = 2, with A > t (this implies 
I I 
that for x small p is negative but sinee p is positive in equilibrium the 
inverse demand funetion can be substituted by p = max (O, x + t - A». Thus, 
T = x + t - A - l.5x so A.4 and the seeond order eondition are fulfilled. 
1 1 
Then, x = 4( A - t), Le. x is deereasing on t. 
V.- CONCLUSIONS. 
In this paper I have tried to integrate several models -sorne of them very 
much used in Industrial Organization and Welfare Economics- and to show that 
the qualitative properties of comparative statics of these models conform with 
our intuition as long as i) the game is a market game and ii) a strong 
concavity condition, which implies strategic substitution, is meto This is 
because in our case the combination of i) and ii) above implies that the best 
reply function is a contraction mapping: uniqueness and "right" comparative 
statics properties follow from that. 
It would be very nice if it could be shown that the qualitative 
properties of models of strategic substitutes and strategic complements are 
similar, Le. that a raise in taxes always decreases total output and 
increases prices. If this were the case we would not need to worry about which 
model is the right one, since both would yield the same qualitative 
predictions. This would alleviate the long-standing polemic between supporters 
of quantity-setting models (Cournot) and price-setting models (Bertrand). 
However, the case of strategic complements presents greater difficulties and 
might require different methods. First, an additional assumption is needed in 
order to guarantee that the best reply function is a contraction (see e.g. 
Friedman (982) p. 504, assumption 6). Second, in the case of entry, it is not 
clear how to model the price of a firm which is not in the market. And third, 
unless additional assumptions are made, the game is not a market game. 
25 
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